Lies and treachery
Lies and treachery are not exactly new features of international politics. In the seventeenth century, Sir Henry Wotton thought an ambassador was “an honest man sent abroad to lie for the good of his country.” That oft-cited definition might obscure, though, the fact that a lie told for temporary advantage might bring long-term disadvantage.
Was that the case with UN Security Council Resolution 1973? The resolution, passed in March 2011, allowed the Western powers to take military action in Libya, but only to protect civilians. They promised not to target the Qaddafi regime or to put arms into the country. The resolution passed only because Russia and China, relying on these assurances, allowed it to pass by abstaining rather than voting “no.”
But France, Britain, and the U.S. did target the regime and did put arms into the country. Russia has been angry about it ever since, and Putin reportedly fears Qaddafi’s grisly fate as a worst-case scenario for himself, an eventuality to be avoided by any means necessary.
This history must be kept in mind as we review the complex situation in Libya today. In case you haven’t heard, Western intervention there did not leave behind a thriving democracy. Instead, Libya has been divided between two warring factions. Now Turkey has announced it will provide military support for one of the factions, the Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli, which has been trying to stave off an offensive led by the forces of Khalifa Haftar, based in the eastern province of Cyrenaica.
Turkey’s move is of a piece with Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. In exchange for propping up the GNA, Turkey got an agreement in November to draw a new maritime border between Turkey and Libya — a border that is said to conveniently ignore annoyances like the Greek island of Crete, although exactly where the new border would run is known only to Turkey and its Libyan allies.
Is the whole affair more than symbolic? Libya was an Ottoman province lost to Italy in 1912, so a little involvement there helps Erdogan’s case that he is restoring Turkey’s imperial glory, such as it was. Military analysts have their doubts about how much power Turkey could bring to bear so far from home. Still, Erdogan is claiming that Turkey will engage on land, sea, and air to defend the embattled GNA; it has already sent a limited number of advisors, and the Turkish parliament has approved the deployment.
The neighbors of Turkey and Libya find little to chuckle at in the story. Soon after the Turkey-Libya border deal was announced, Greece expelled the Libyan ambassador from Athens. Israel, Greece, and Cyprus noisily announced, on January 2, a joint pipeline project to bring gas from the eastern Mediterranean to the EU. This pipeline, to be known as EastMed, had already been listed as, at least in theory, a part of the EU’s plan to diversify its energy sources. Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are trying to push it onto the diplomatic agenda now in order to stake out their own claims in the region against those of Turkey.
Erdogan, undaunted, announced with Putin on January 8 in Istanbul his own eastern Mediterranean pipeline, this one to be called TurkStream. But that same day, the foreign ministers of Greece, France, Cyprus, and Egypt met in Cairo and issued a statement firmly opposing Turkey’s expansionist plans.
What exactly did Putin and Erdogan say about Libya during their January 8 meeting? Well, we don’t know, but we do know that Russia supports the anti-GNA forces in Libya, thus putting it on the opposing side to Turkey. There are reportedly more than 1,000 Russian mercenaries in Libya now (which Russia denies, as well it might since the GNA is the government approved by the Security Council), while Putin has told Erdogan not to send Turkish troops. After their meeting, Erdogan and Putin called for a ceasefire to begin an midnight January 12. All of their posturing has been little more than a transparent attempt to find any excuse to jockey for position a little bit further afield than they normally would. The chaos left by Western intervention in Libya has provided the opening.
As a journalist for Le Monde has put it: “Moscow and Ankara hope thus to take their revenge on the Western powers by trying to impose themselves as major actors in a new Yalta, in the Mediterranean as in the Near East.”
What might be the next moves in Libya? The UN-appointed mediator of the conflict, Ghassan Salamé, was asked recently whether Russia and Turkey might simply divide Libya between themselves. Salamé’s answer: yes.
I think it’s safe to say that that was definitely not one of the outcomes envisaged by France, Britain, and the U.S. when they dishonestly pushed through UNSCR 1973 nine years ago this March.
Thanks very much for reading! Please share this newsletter with any friends or colleagues who might find it interesting. Thank you!